This book was first published in 1996 and became really famous after the 9/11/2001 terror attacks, because a large portion of the book is dedicated to the clash between the West and Islam. However, in 2024, this book remains relevant, because it also addresses the conflict in Ukraine, the conflict in Israel and the rise of China. And even if not all predictions have turned true (Japan and Taiwan haven't turned to China), the civilizational logic has indeed shaped a lot of events along the lines that Huntington foresaw.
Since this is such an important book rich in ideas, let's start by summarizing some of the most important ideas.
First, Huntington acknowledges that the fall of the Iron curtain in the early 1990s has changed the world. With the fall of the communist bloc based on ideology, the world is back to groups of civilizations that are based on religion/ethnicity:. The major civilization is the Western one and then there are the others, the non-Western civilizations: Latin American, African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist, Japanese.
In page 37, Huntington states that Mearsheimer's statist paradigm highlights the risks of a conflict between Russia and Ukraine, he thinks that his civilizational approach can encourage cooperation between these 2 countries. These statements are interesting, because they show that Huntington's aim is to avoid the clash, not to seek it. The purpose of identifying the fault lines between civilizations is to be more careful about them, because they hold the most potential for violence. That's why he says that Ukraine is at risk: this country is orthodox in the East and Uniate Greek catholic in the West. So, while Mearsheimer's predictions have been realized concerning Ukraine, it's interesting to notice that Huntington's book is pointing to the coming resolution of the conflict: a split of the country along to the civilizational line.
In Chapter 3, Huntington distinguishes between Westernization and Modernization. Western leaders have had a universal approach to values. They believed that the end of communism meant that Western values would take over the world through commerce and Hollywood movies. However, "people define their identity by what they are not" and non-Western people still continue to see themselves differently. They want to enjoy modern technology and prosperity, but don't want to give up their identity.
On page 67, this interesting quote of Dale Copeland: "Economic interdependence fosters peace only 'when states expect that high trade levels will continue into the foreseeable future'. Here's how decoupling from China could lead to conflict...
In chapter 4, Huntington examines the shifting balance of civilizations. He notices that "Western nations:
- Own and operate the international banking system,
- Control all hard currencies,
- Are the world's principal customer,
- Provide the majority of the world's finished goods,
- Dominate capital markets,
- Exert considerable moral leadership
- Are capable of military interventions
- Control the sea lanes.
- Conduct the most advanced technical R&D
- Control leading edge technical education
- Dominate access to space
- Dominate the aerospace industry
- Dominate international communications
- Dominate high-end weapons industry"
In 1996, these fields were uncontested. 28 years later, the Western leadership is still strong, but there's decline and competition in several fields. Huntington saw the premises of decline in the following: slower economic growth, stagnating population, unemployment, huge public deficits, declining work ethic, low saving rates, drug use and crime.
For Huntington, the decline of the West is a slow process. The open democratic institutions of the West have a great capacity for renewal. Also, the West has 2 centers (the US and Europe) and the decline of Europe has been compensated by the rise of the US.
Page 88, Huntington observes that "it appears probable that for the most of history China had the world's largest economy. The diffusion of technology and the economic development of non-Western societies in the second half of the 20th century are now producing a return to historical patterns. This will be a slow process, but by the middle of the 21st century, if not before, the distribution of economic product and manufacturing output among the leading civilizations is likely to resemble that of 1800. The 200 years old 'blip' on the world economy will be over."
Page 92: "As Western power declines, the ability of the West to impose Western concepts of human rights, liberalism and democracy on other civilizations also declines and so does the attractiveness of those values to others." The second part of this statement is probably even more important: people imitate successful models and the more the Western model appears flawed, the less it is imitated. Page 93, "The revolt against the West was originally legitimated by asserting the universality of Western values. It is now legitimated by asserting the superiority of non-Western values."
The trend is the unsecularization of the world. The non-West wants to be modern, but not Western. The question 'which side are you on?' has been replaced by the much more fundamental 'Who are you?' Culture identity matters again. In chapter 6, Huntington studies how Russia, Turkey, Mexico and Australia have been 'torn' countries, torn between the West (or Asia for Australia) and their own identity. For all these torn countries, culture has prevailed.
In chapter 7, we learn that in 1992, 80% of foreign direct investment in China came from overseas Chinese (68% Hong Kong, 9% Taiwan, Singapore/Macao/others the rest). Japan provided 6.6% and the US 4.6% of total. This means that it's not so much the big US companies that delocalized their factories, but the Asian suppliers of US companies. In this chapter, Huntington sees closer ties between the Mainland and Taiwan. This prediction hasn't come true, mostly because Taiwan institutions have become more westernized.
As for Islam, Huntington underlines the fact that loyalty is either on the religious level or down to the tribe, but that nations are less cohesive than in the West. "The absence of an Islamic core state is a major contribution to the pervasive internal and external conflicts which characterize Islam. Consciousness without cohesion is a source of weakness to Islam and a source of threat to other civilizations." Turkey could become the core state of Islam again, but it would take a leader of Ataturk's caliber and legitimacy (...) to remake Turkey from a torn country into a core state.
In Chapter 8, Huntington predicts more conflicts between civilizations and thinks that some antagonisms will be more violent than others: Islam and Orthodox, Islam and African, Islam and Hindu, Islam and Western Christian. The dangerous clashes will "come from Western arrogance, Islamic intolerance and Sinic assertiveness". Western arrogance shows up in the double standards: democracy is good, but not if islamists come to power, human rights are brought up in China, but not in Saudi Arabia... On page 186, Huntington says that it's important that the West "protect the cultural, social, and ethnic integrity of Western societies by restricting the number of non-Western admitted as immigrants or refugees."
In Chapter 9, Huntington talks about Russia again. He envisions an agreement between NATO and Russia whereby NATO would expand to include the Western Christian countries of the former Eastern bloc, while Russia would be responsible for the security of the Orthodox countries or territories where Orthodox predominate. A pact of non-aggression would seal the deal. Then, the fact that both Russia and Europe are aging societies with low birth rates should have prevented a conflict. From this recommendation, we can see that the West tried to control land beyond its civilizational fault line and we can assume that Huntington hasn't be heard.
In Chapter 10, page 255 Huntington repeats what he wrote in Chapter 8 "At the global level of world politics the primary clash of civilizations is between the West and the rest, at the micro or local level it is between Islam and the others."
In Chapter 12, page 311, Huntington advises the West "not to attempt to stop the shift in power but to learn to navigate the shallows, endure the miseries, moderate its ventures, and safeguard its culture. (...) The principal responsibility of Western leaders, consequently, is not to attempt to reshape other civilizations in the image of the West, which is beyond their declining power, but to preserve, protect, and renew the unique qualities of Western civilization." This is mostly the responsibility of the USA.
Here are 2 recommendations he makes:
"- to restrain the development of the conventional and unconventional military power of Islamic and Sinic countries.
- to accept Russia as the core state of Orthodoxy and a major regional power with legitimate interests in the security of its southern borders."
The other recommendations are to achieve a better integration of Europe and the USA, to maintain the West's technological advance, to encourage a Westernization of Latin America, to slow the drift of Japan away from the West and NOT intervene in the affairs of other civilizations. Instead, negotiate peace through the pressure of core states.
These are the excerpts that have most retained my attention, but the whole book makes a very detailed case for Huntington's views. They are much more peaceful than the reputation or the title of the book suppose. As for Ukraine, I would argue that from Huntington's point of view, NATO has overreached. This will probably be dealt with by the Trump presidency, since he has assured voters that he can settle this war within 24 hours.
As for China and the future, this book contains some warnings. Militarily, the expansion of NATO to the Pacific and the South China sea should be seen as a similar overreach as what the US tried in Ukraine. That's where Huntington's arrogance of the West could meet the Sinic assertiveness!
In what most specialists call the 'chips war' between the West and China, the act of denying the best chips to the Chinese economy goes further than restraining the development of military power. This is an attempt to maintain the technological lead, not by running faster, but by slowing Chinese development. It has nothing to do with military, but with technological dominance. And this is a very threatening move against China. It happens within the talk of reshoring and decoupling. As noted from page 67, a dwindling trade with the West is a threat to the development of China (where poverty, especially in rural areas, is still higher than in the West) and risks war. So, it shouldn't be a surprise if China massively subsidizes this high tech sector and tries to catch up to the West at all costs. Next step is to complain that China distorts the market and to impose high tariffs (like on EV and solar panels). What the US doesn't consider is that the West's strength isn't industrial state policy, but innovation fueled by competition and the hope of profits. There's much that can go wrong. It starts with the fact that the trade barriers will protect Western firms to the point that they'll enjoy the profits in the Western world, but won't innovate sufficiently to keep their advance.
It's impressive how relevant this book continues to be 28 years after it was published!